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I .  STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature o f  the Case. 
The nature of this case arises from the execution of a Non-Competition 
Agreement between appellant, T.J.T., Inc. ("TJT"), and appellee Ulysses Mori ("Mori") in 
connection with the purchase and sale Mori's business located in Northern California known as 
Leg-it Tire Company, Inc. The Non-Competition Agreement involved in that sale included a 
California choice of law provision and is presumptively valid pursuant to well recognized 
California law permitting parties to enter a covenant not to compete in connection with the sale 
of a business. Because of Mori's several breaches of the Non-Competition Agreement- 
including going to work for and opening a local facility on behalf of a long-time TJT competitor 
in the same Northern California market-TJT filed suit in the district court on May 3 1,2007, to 
enforce the agreement. 
B. Course o f  Proceedings Below. 
On September 21,2007, TJT filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction and for 
Partial Summary Judgment. ER 000001 (ROA). Specifically, TJT sought to enjoin Mori from 
competing with TJT in violation of the Non-Competition Agreement and to obtain partial 
summary judgment on the issue of Mori's liability for breach of the Non-Competition 
Agreement. At the time of the filing of TJT's Motion for Preliminary Injunction and for Partial 
Summary Judgment, there was no dispute that Mori was working for a long-time TJT 
competitor, West States Tire & Axle. At the close of the October 22,2007, hearing on TJT's 
motion, the district court denied TJT's request for injunctive relief and the district court entered 
an order reflecting the same on October 24,2007. ER 000217-000218. Because Mori had filed 
his own motion for summary judgment days before the October 22,2007, injunction hearing, the 
district court did not address TJT's motion for partial summay judgment and, instead, continued 
the hearing so that both summary judgment motions could be heard on the same day. 
On November 26,2007, the district court heard oral argument on TJT's motion 
for partial summary judgment as to liability, and on Mori's motion for summary judgment on all 
counts. On January 31,2008, the district court issued its Memorandum Decision and Order on 
the Parties' Summary Judgments wherein the district court denied TJT's request for partial 
summary judgment and granted Mori's motion for summary judgment in its entirety. 
ER 000229-000235. In support of its rulings, the district court held that the Non-Competition 
Agreement was void as a matter of California law. Id. at 000232-00234. 
Mori filed a motion for attorney's fees and TJT opposed that motion, arguing that 
because the district court declared the underlying Non-Competition Agreement void under 
California law, Mori could not enforce an attorney's fee provision contained within the voided 
agreement. TJT also argued that Mori's claimed attorney's fees were unreasonable and 
excessive. On June 2,2008, the court entered a Judgment awarding defendant Mori his 
requested attorney's fees and costs in the amount of $107,236.85. ER 000265-000267. The 
same day, the Court subsequently issued an Order granting defendant Mori's motion for 
attorney's fees and costs under Idaho Code Section 12-120(3) for the same amount. On June 16, 
2008, TJT filed a Motion for Reconsideration or, in the Alternative, Motion to Alter or Amend 
Judgment. Specifically, TJT requested the district court to reconsider its prior order granting 
attorney's fees and make specific rulings regarding: (a) whether California law or Idaho law 
governs Mori's fee request; and (b) to determine the reasonableness of the fee award, together 
with the other Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54 factors, in connection with its $100,000-plus fee 
award to Mori. Alternatively, TJT requested the district court to amend an error in the June 2, 
2008 Judgment to strike the incorrect reference that "[nlo opposition has been filed" by TJT in 
response to Mori's request for attorney's fees and costs given that TJT has filed a detailed 
objection. See ER 000246-000264 (TJT's 3110108 Memorandum in Opposition). 
On October 16,2008, the district court heard TJT's Motion for Reconsideration 
or, In the Alternative, to Alter or Amend Judgment. On November 21,2008, the district court 
entered an order acknowledging the error in the June 2,2008 Judgment, but denying TJT's 
motion for reconsideration. ER 000270-000274. Specifically, the district court found that both 
Idaho and California law provide for an award of attorney's fees and, thus, no conflict of laws 
analysis was necessary. Id. at 000271-000272. Additionally, the district court concluded that 
Mori's claimed attorney's fees were not unreasonable. Id. at 000272. 
TJT appeals from the district court's grant of summary judgment to Mori, the 
district court's denial of TJT's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, and the district court's 
award of attorney's fees to Mori. 
C. Statement of  Facts. 
1. Nature of  TJT's business. 
TJT is an Idaho publicly traded company whose core business involves 
purchasing axles and tires that have been used to transport manufactured homes from factory to 
home sites and which, pursuant to certain federal regulations, must be inspected and refurbished 
or replaced after each trip. The tires and axles purchased from manufactured housing dealers and 
independent brokers (individuals or companies that simply gather up and sell used axles and tires 
to recyclers like TJT) are refurbished and recertified by TJT, and then sold to manufactured 
home factories for reuse. ER 000006 (Verified Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial ("Verified 
Complaint") 7 5); ER 000024 (Answer 7 6). In addition to the refurbishing of axles and tires, 
TJT also distributes vinyl siding, skirting, and other aftermarket "set-up" products to 
manufactured housing dealers and "set-up" contractors. TJT serves customers in a thirteen-state 
area from its recycling facilities located in: (1) Emmett, Idaho; (2) Centralia, Washington; 
(3) Platteville, Colorado; (4) Phoenix, Arizona; and (5) Woodland, California. Id. 
2. TJT's purchase of its competitor, Leg-it Tire Company, Inc. 
In 1980, Mori started a business known as Leg-it Tire Company, Inc. ("Leg-it") to 
purchase tires and axles and sell them to manufactured home factories. ER 000041 (Deposition 
of Ulysses Mori ("Mori Depo."), p. 18, LL. 1-6). Leg-it was initially located in Thornton, 
California, and had a starting operating budget of $1,500.00. Id. (Mori Depo., p. 18, LL. 13-20). 
From 1980 to 1997, defendant Mori grew the business of Leg-it by purchasing tires and axles 
from retailers of manufactured homes, and refurbishing and reselling those tires and axles for 
purchase by manufactured home factories. Id. (Mori Depo., p. 19, L.7 - p. 20, L. 15). As such, 
in 1997 TJT and Leg-it were competing in the same line of business. 
In June 1997, defendant Mori was a shareholder, officer and director of Leg-it, 
which had been relocated to Woodland, California. At that time, Leg-it continued to be engaged 
in the same type of business as TJT and was doing business in the states of California, Oregon, 
Washington, Nevada, Idaho, Montana, Nebraska, Arizona, and Texas. ER 000007 (Verified 
Complaint 7 8); ER 000025 (Answer 7 9). In 1997, Mori approached TJT to discuss the 
possibility of the sale of Leg-it to TJT. TJT was interested in the transaction, as it desired to 
expand its business into California and to strengthen its competitive position in the Oregon and 
Washington markets. Id. At the time of the contemplated merger between Leg-it and TJT, Leg- 
it had seventeen employees, and annual sales ranging between $3 and $4 million. ER 000042 
(Mori Depo., p. 22, LL. 4-13). Moreover, Leg-it's balance sheet as of June 7, 1997, reflected 
total equity in the amount of $510,718.00. ER 000074-000075 (1997 Leg-it Balance Sheet); 
ER 000045 (Mori Depo., p. 35, LL. 6-9). 
On June 24, 1997, TJT and Leg-it executed an Agreement and Plan of Merger 
("Merger Agreement"), whereby Leg-it merged with TJT. ER 000079 (Merger Agreement 7 2.1 
at 4); ER 000045-000046 (Mori Depo., p. 37, L. 16 - p. 38, L. 11). The corporate entity, TJT, 
became the "surviving corporation," and continued its corporate existence under the laws of the 
state of Washington. ER 000007 (Verified Complaint 7 10); ER 000025 (Answer 7 11). In 
connection with the merger, TJT paid to Mori, the sole shareholder of Leg-it, $412,500.00 in 
cash, and issued 291,176 shares of restricted TJT common stock to Mori valued at the time at 
approximately $600,000.00. ER 000046 (Mori Depo., p. 38, L. 12 -p. 39, L. 3); ER 000079 
(Merger Agreement 3 2.1 at 4). Thus, TJT paid Mori in excess of $1 million for his Leg-it 
business. TJT also gave Mori a seat on TJT's board of directors, and Mori became responsible 
for day-to-day management of the Woodland, California, facility as a senior vice president of 
TJT. ER 000007 (Verified Complaint 7 11); ER 000025 (Answer 7 12); ER 000048 (Mori 
Depo., p. 47, L. 25 - p. 48, L. 5). 
As part of the Leg-it merger with TJT, Mori was required to execute and did 
execute a separate Employment Agreement with TJT. Ancillary to the Leg-it merger with TJT, 
Mori was also required to execute and did execute a Non-Competition Agreement with TJT. The 
execution of the Non-Competition Agreement was a material term in the parties' Merger 
Agreement and assured TJT that Mori would not compete in the same business as TJT during a 
defined period and within a defined territory. ER 000007-000008 (Verified Complaint 13); 
ER 000050 (Mori Depo., p. 56, L. 15 - p. 57, L. 2); ER 0001 11-0001 18 (Non-Competition 
Agreement). 
The Non-Competition Agreement that Mori signed as the seller of Leg-it 
contained a covenant not to compete, which provides: 
(a) For the period beginning on the Effective Date and ending 
two (2) years following Seller's [Mori's] termination of 
employment with the Company [TJT] for any reason (such period 
being the "Term"): 
(i) [Mori] shall not, directly or indirectly, either for 
himself or any other Person, engage or invest in, own, manage, 
operate, finance, control, or participate in the ownership, 
management, operation, financing, or control of, be employed by, 
associated with, or in any manner connected with, lend [Mori's] 
name or any similar name to, lend [Mori's] credit to, or render 
services or advise to, any business whose products or activities 
compete in whole or in part with the products or activities of the 
Company andfor Leg-it, anywhere within 1000 miles of any 
facility owned or operated by the Company or Leg-it; provided, 
however, [Mori] may purchase or otherwise acquire up to (but not 
more than) five percent (5%) of any class of securities of any 
enterprise (but without otherwise participating in the activities of 
such enterprise) if such securities are listed on any national or 
regional securities exchange or have been registered under 
Section 12(g) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; provided, 
further, that [Mori] may continue his involvement with SAC 
Industries, Inc. ("SAC"), so long as SAC restricts its operations to 
its current line of business and does not expand its activities to 
compete with the Company in any other business area. 
(ii) [Mori] shall not, directly or indirectly, either for 
himself or any other Person, (A) solicit, induce or recruit, attempt 
to solicit, induce or recruit any employee of the Company or Leg-it 
to leave the employ of the Company or Leg-it, (B) in any way 
interfere with the relationship between the Company or Leg-it and 
any employee thereof, (C) employ, or otherwise engage as an 
employee, independent contractor, or otherwise, any employee of 
the Company or Leg-it or (D) induce or attempt to induce any 
customer, representative, supplier, licensee, or business relation of 
the Company or Leg-it to cease doing business with Company or 
Leg-it, or in any way interfere with the relationship between any 
customer, representative, supplier, licensee, or business relation of 
the Company or Leg-it. 
(iii) [Mori] shall not, directly or indirectly, either for 
himself or any other Person, do business with or solicit the 
business of any Person known to [Mori] to be a customer of, or 
potential customer of, the Company or Leg-it, whether or not 
[Mori] had personal contact with such Person, with respect to 
products, services or other business activities which compete in 
whole or in part with the products, services or other business 
activities of the Company or Leg-it. 
(b) In the event of a breach by [Mori] of any covenant set forth 
in Section 4(a) above, the term of such covenant shall be extended 
by the period of the duration of such breach; 
(e) The time, scope, geographic area and other provisions 
hereof are reasonable and are necessary under the circumstances to 
protect the Company and to enable the-company to receive the 
benefit of its bargain under the Merger Agreement. 
ER 000008-000009 (Verified Complaint 7 14); ER 0001 13-0001 14 won-Competition 
Agreement). 
3. Mori's employment with TJT. 
Immediately following the execution of the Merger Agreement, Mori became and 
served in the capacity as a director and officer of TJT. In those capacities, Mori participated in 
the management of TJT and he regularly attended hoard and management meetings in the state 
of Idaho. ER 000052 (Mori Depo., p. 63, L. 21 -p. 64, L. 10). During the board and 
management meetings that Mori attended, the direction and strategy of TJT's business was 
discussed, and confidences were shared. Id. (Mori Depo., p. 64, L. 11 - p. 65, L. 7). 
Additionally, during TJT board and management meetings, TJT's business plans, strategy, 
pricing information and price lists, marketing plans, market studies, sales methods and processes, 
product specifications, know-how, processes, ideas, customer lists and accounts, current and 
anticipated customer requirements, computer information systems, and other competitively 
sensitive information were regularly discussed. ER 000010 (Verified Complaint 1 16). 
Mori moved to Idaho in 2000 and continued in his officer, director, and vice 
president role at TJT. ER 000049 (Mori Depo., p. 50, LL. 20-22). Mori served as senior vice 
president of marketing and corporate sales manager. In his capacity as sales manager, Mori 
became familiar with TJT's customer accounts in each of the regions in which TJT did business 
and also learned of several dealers from which TJT purchased used tires and axles. ER 000051 
(Mori Depo., p. 59, L. 18 - p. 60, L. 15). Moreover, as the senior vice president of marketing 
and corporate sales manager, Mori created a directory of TJT customers for use in connection 
with TJT's marketing efforts. ER 000010 (Verified Complaint r/ 16); ER 000050-000051 (Mori 
Depo., p. 57, L. 22 - p. 58, L. 11). Additionally, as corporate sales manager, Mori's charge was 
to improve the sales of the company, which included mentoring TJT's employees in connection 
with the purchase and sale of tires and axles in faciIities located in Washington, Oregon, 
Arizona, and Idaho. Id. (Mori Depo., p. 58, L. 12 - p. 59, L. 11). Mori was also involved in new 
business development for TJT while he was an employee of TJT. ER 000048 (Mori Depo., 
p. 48, L. 21 - p. 49, L. 24). Specifically, Mori participated in securing an important contract for 
TJT to provide Oakwood Homes, a larger manufacturer, with tires and axles. ER 000049 (Mori 
Depo., p. 50, L. 22 -p. 52, L. 14). 
4. Mori's departure from and competition with TJT. 
At times during this employment with TJT, Mori considered making an attempt to 
remove TJT's chief executive officer, Terry Sheldon. ER 000053 (Mori Depo., p. 66, L. 24 - 
p. 67, L. 8). Moreover, Mori had his own ambitions about running TJT one day. ER 000052 
(Mori Depo., p. 63, LL. 5-20). Mori also sought to gain control over TJT by having discussions 
with a major shareholder of TJT regarding the purchase of 800,000 shares of TJT stock. 
ER 000069 (Mori Depo., p. 130, L. 14 - p. 132, L. 16). After his efforts to remove TJT's chief 
executive officer Terry Sheldon andlor to purchase a controlling interest of TJT failed, Mori 
devised aplan by January 2007 to exit his employment with TJT and return to a business that 
would directly compete with every aspect of TJT's core business, including its tire and axle 
business. ER 000054 ( Mori Depo., p. 71, LL. 4-24). During the time that he devised his plan to 
compete with TJT, Mori was a director and an employee of TJT. Id. (Mori Depo., p. 71, LL. 4- 
10). Specifically, Mori testified in his deposition that, during the time that he was a TJT 
employee, he planned to go to work for TJT's competition, West States Recycling, Inc. and West 
States Tire & Axle. Id. (Mori Depo., p. 70, LL. 18-21); ER 000056 (Mori Depo., p. 80, LL. 10- 
14). West States Recycling, Inc. holds itself out as a leading supplier of certified mobile home 
axles and tires. Moreover, West States Recycling, Inc. and West States Tire & Axle conduct the 
same lines of business as TJT in the Western United States and have locations in California, 
Utah, Arizona and Idaho, and seek to do business in Oregon and Washington. ER 00001 1 
(Verified Complaint 1 21); ER 000027 (Answer 1[ 22). As Mori testified in his deposition, just 
like TJT, West States Tire & Axle is in the business of recovering and selling tires and axles. 
ER 000056 (Mori Depo., p. 78, LL. 22-25). 
In January 2007, Mori met with Heath Sartini, who is the owner of West States 
Tire & Axle and a significant shareholder of West States Recycling, Inc., to discuss the eventual 
hiring of Mori as a salesman of tires and axles. ER 000054 (Mori Depo., p. 71, L. 21 - p. 72, 
L. 23). Mori believed he could be an effective salesman of tires and axles as a result of his past 
experience, which included his experience with Leg-it and TJT. Id. (Mori Depo., p. 72, L. 24 - 
p. 73, L. 23). On January 12,2007, Mori resigned as a director of TJT and, on February 7,2007, 
Mori resigned as an employee of TJT and announced to TJT that he was leaving to become a 
full-time real estate agent with TJT Realty, LLC. ER 000010 (Verified Complaint 7 18); 
ER 000027 (Answer 1[ 19); ER 000050 (Mori Depo., p. 57, LL. 3-12). 
However, in February 2007, Mori did not become a full-time real estate agent, but 
rather West State Tire & Axle hired Mori as an employee and Mori later became an employee of 
West States Recycling, Inc. ER 000055 (Mori Depo., p. 76, L. 24 - p. 77, L. 2); ER 000056 
(Mori Depo., p. 78, LL. 16-21); ER 000027 (Answer fi 22). Mori's position with West States 
Recycling, Inc. was salesman, and he was paid a base salary of $150,000.00 per year. 
ER 000046 (Mori Depo., p. 39, LL. 21-23); ER 000056 (Mori Depo., p. 78, LL. 2-3); ER 000059 
(Mori Depo., p. 91, LL. 9-12). Together with Heath Sartini, Mori devised a business plan to 
accumulate, process, and sell axles in facilities located in Idaho and TJT's back yard. 
ER 000056-000057 (Mori Depo., p. 81, L. 17 -p. 82, L. 12). To that end, Mori facilitated the 
opening of a West States Recycling, Inc. warehouse facility in Idaho to support local Idaho 
customers who purchase tires and axles. ER 000057 (Mori Depo., p. 82, L. 18 - p. 84, L. 3). 
Mori testified during his deposition that he alone selected the facility and that he intended to 
personally run the new Idaho facility. Id. (Mori Depo., p. 85, LL. 14-17); ER 000062 (Mori 
Depo., p. 105, LL. 5-12). After Mori opened the Idaho facility, he sent e-mails to officials at the 
Oregon Manufactured Housing Association and the Idaho Manufactured ~ o u i i n g  Association 
with a picture of the facility to promote the business of West States Recycling, Inc. ER 0001 19- 
000121 (7131107 Mori e-mail). 
During his deposition, Mori readily admitted that he is attempting to compete 
with TJT and is approached TJT's customers immediately after leaving TJT: 
Q. You do admit that today you are competing with TJT; is that 
correct? 
A. Z am doing sales for West States Recycling. 
Q. Are you doing that in competition to TJT? 
A. West States Recycling is in competition with TJT. 
Q. In doing so, you are competing in markets in which TJT is 
operating; correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. In markets that TJT was operating in at the time that you sold 
your business to TJT; correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You are competing in Idaho and TJT sure was in Idaho in 
1997; was it not? 
A. I said yes. 
Q. TJT is in Washington and Oregon; correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And was at the time Leg-it was purchased by TJT? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You are also competing in northern California where your 
business was located; is that correct? 
THE WITNESS: I have not made any contacts at factories, that I 
can recall, in northern California. I did call on Mike Bettleyon, so 
if Mike Bettleyon as a supplier is competition, yes. 
Q. (BY MR. WARD) You plan on continuing to compete in 
northern California, Zpresume; correct? 
A. As long as fhe company directs me that way. 
Q. You have contacted factories that arepresent customers of 
TJT in Idaho, Washington, and Oregon; correct? 
A. And others, correct. 
ER 000061 (Mori Depo., p. 99, L. 3 - p. 100, L. 21) (intemption by counsel omitted) (emphasis 
added). 
As an employee of either West States Recycling, Inc. or West States Tire & Axle, 
Mori also admitted soliciting the business of the following known TJT customers: Champion 
Homes, KIT Homebuilders, Skyline Corporation, Guerdon Industries Idaho, Nashua Homes of 
Idaho, and Fleetwood Homes of Idaho. ER 000063 (Mori Depo., p. 108, L. 21 - p. 109, L. 16); 
ER 000064 (Mori Depo., p. 112, L. 4 - p. 113, L. 25); ER 000064-000065 (Mori Depo., p. 113, 
L. 24 - p. 114, L. 11); ER 000065-000066 (Mori Depo., p. 117, L. 8 - p. 118, L. 7); ER 000066 
(Mori Depo., p. 118, L. 9 - p. 120, L. 10); id. (Mori Depo., p. 120, L. 12 - p. 121, L. 3). In 
addition to telephone contacts, Mori solicited a number of these entities by e-mail. ER 000119- 
000131. 
The covenant not to compete in the Non-Competition Agreement does not end 
until two years after the termination of Mori's employment with TJT. Accordingly, Mori's 
admitted competition within two years of the termination of his employment with TJT 
constituted a breach of the Non-Competition Agreement. The district court failed to recognize 
Mori's breach and, instead, found the Non-Competition Agreement void. Accordingly, TJT 
appeals to this Court. 
11. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the district court erred in concluding that the Non-Competition 
Agreement between TJT and Mori was void and therefore unenforceable under California law. 
2. Whether the district court erred in concluding that California law permits 
Mori to recover attorney's fees. 
3. Whether the district court erred in granting Mori's motion for attorney's 
fees without considering, addressing, or analyzing all factors presented under Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 54(e)(3) to determine the proper amount of a fee award. 
111. ARGUMENT 
A. The District Court Erred in Granting Summary Judgment to Mori Because 
the Non-Competition Agreement Is Enforceable Under California Law. 
1. Standard of review. 
Upon review of an order of the district court granting summary judgment, the 
standard of review is the same standard used by the district court in ruling on the motion. 
Watson v. Weick, 141 Idaho 500,504, 112 P.3d 788,792 (2005). Summary judgment is 
appropriate when "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party 
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." IDAHO R. CIV. P. 56(c). If there is no genuine issue 
of material fact, "only a question of law remains, over which this Court exercises free review." 
Watson, 141 Idaho at 504. 
2. The district court's analysis of the Non-Competition Agreement. 
The district court's conclusion that the Non-Competition Agreement was 
unenforceable and its subsequent grant of summary judgment to Mori was based on a mixture of 
legal errors and overlooking genuine factual disputes that preclude summary judgment in Mori's 
favor. Those errors are more l l l y  detailed throughout this brief, but are briefly summarized 
below. 
The district court first found that the geographic scope of the Non-Competition 
Agreement was overly broad based on its conclusion-at the summary judgment stage-that the 
business of Leg-it was almost "exclusively limited" to Northem California. ER 000232 (1131108 
Order). As demonstrated below, Mori testified during the preliminary injunction hearing that the 
business of Leg-it was carried on in 11 Western states in 1997. ER 000212-000213 (10122108 
Tr. p. 26, L 20 - p. 30, L. 20); see also ER 000216. At a minimum, there exist genuine issues of 
material fact as to whether the business of Leg-it was, in hct, almost exclusively limited to 
Northern California. 
The district court also found that the term of the Non-Competition Agreement was 
tied to Mori's employment and was therefore void pursuant to Section 16600. ER 000233- 
000234 (1131108 Order). Embedded in this determination is the district court's conclusion lhat 
the Non-Competition Agreement was more akin to an "employment" non-compete as opposed to 
a non-compete made ancillary to the sale of a business. Id. As more fully demonstrated below, 
the district court committed several factual and legal errors in reaching this conclusion. 
First, the district court ignored well established authorities under California law 
regarding the permissible duration of a covenant not to compete made ancillary to the sale of a 
business and instead relied two reported cases from Nebraska. Additionally, the district court 
also went outside of the four comers of the Non-Competition Agreement by noting extraneous 
evidence that, during negotiations, TJT and Mori initially discussed a six-year term for the Non- 
Competition Agreement. There can be no doubt that the parties ultimately agreed that the two- 
year covenant not to compete would begin to run beginning the day after Mori's employment 
with TJT terminated. Even if such extraneous evidence during negotiations could be considered 
under California law, given the basic and genuine factual dispute as to the parties intent 
regarding the reasonableness of the period of time necessary to protect the goodwill of Leg-it 
purchased by TJT, it was error for the district court to grant summary judgment on this basis. 
3. Covenant not to compete made ancillary to the sale of a business 
versus an "employment" covenant not to compete. 
California Business and Professions Code Section 16601' governs the 
enforceability of covenants not to compete made ancillary to the sale of a business under 
California law and provides: 
Anyperson who sells thegoodwill of a business, or any owner of 
a business entity selling or otherwise disposing of all of his or her 
ownership interest in the business entity, or any owner of a 
business entity that sells (a) all or substantially all of its 
operating assets together with the goodwill of the business entity, 
(b) all or substantially all of the operating assets of a division or a 
subsidiary of the business entity together with the goodwill of that 
division or subsidiary, or (c) all of the ownership interest of any 
subsidiary, mav a m  with the buver to refrain from carwins on 
a similar business within a specified peoaraphic area in which 
the business so sold, or that o f  the business entity, division. or 
subsidiarv has been carried on, so lona as the buver, or anv 
person derivins title to the soodwill or ownership interest from 
the buver, carries on a like business therein. 
CAL. BUS. &PROF. CODE 9 16601 (emphasis added). 
Although California public policy prohibits "employment" non-competition 
agreements (compare California Business and Professions Code Section 16600), the covenant at 
issue in this case without question was made ancillary to the sale of a business, i.e., Leg-it. Since 
before the turn of the 20th Century, California courts have enforced non-compete provisions 
' The Non-Competition Agreement between TJT and defendant Mori contains a 
California choice of law provision. Accordingly, TJT will analyze the enforceability of the Non- 
Competition Agreement under California law. ER 0001 15 (Non-Competition Agreement 7 10(a) 
at 5) ("This Agreement shall be governed by, construed, interpreted and applied in accordance 
with the laws of the state of California, without giving effect to any conflict of laws rules that 
would refer the matter to another jurisdiction."). 
made ancillary to the sale of a business. See Franz v. Bieler, 126 Cal. 176 (1899) (enforcing 
covenant under predecessor to Section 16601); see also Stephens v. Bean, 65 Cal. App. 779 
(1924) (same); Mahlstedt v. Fugit, 79 Cal. App. 2d 562 (1947) (same). Accordingly, the public 
policy in favor of allowing a party to enforce a covenant not to compete made ancillary to the 
sale of a business is equally as strong. 
In the seminal case addressing the enforceability and breach of a covenant not to 
compete made ancillary to the sale of business under California law, the California Court of 
Appeal stated that "[c]ovenants arising out of the sale of a business are more liberally enforced 
than those arising out of the employer-employee relationship." Monogvam Indus., Inc. v. SAR 
Indus., Inc., 64 Cal. App. 3d 692,697, 134 Cal. Rptr. 714 (1976). Moreover, the California 
Court of AppeaI noted: 
In the case of the sale of the goodwill of a business it is "unfair" 
for the seller to engage in competition which diminishes the 
value of the asset he sold. In order to protect the buyer kom that 
type of "unfair" competition, a covenant not to compete will be 
enforced to the extent that it is reasonable and necessary in terms 
of time, activity and territory to protect the buyer's interest. 
Id. at 698 (citation omitted and emphasis added). Additionally, in defining the restricted area 
within which the seller of a business could not engage in competition, the Monogram court held: 
We hold that in the provisions of Business and Professions Code 
section 16601 the area where a business is "carried on" is not 
limited to the locations of its buildings, plants and warehouses, nor 
the area in which it actually made sales. The territorial limits are 
coextensive with the entire area in which the parties conducted 
all phases o f  their business including production, promotional 
and marketing activities as well as sales, 
Id. at 702 (emphasis added). 
Against these principles expressly recognized by the California statute and 
controlling case law, there can be no doubt that the Non-Competition Agreement executed by 
Mori is enforceable. In 1997, TJT purchased all of Leg-it's outstanding shares from Mori and 
merged Leg-it into TJT. ER 000046 (Mori Depo., p. 38, L. 12 - p. 39, L. 3); ER 000079 
(Merger Agreement 7 2.1 at 4). Accordingly, TJT purchased the ~ business of Leg-it, 
including its goodwill. In connection with TJT's purchase of Leg-it, Mori and TJT entered into 
the Non-Competition Agreement. At the time that Mori sold Leg-it to TJT, Leg-it "conducted 
phases" of its tire and axle recycling business in California, Oregon, Washington, Nevada, Idaho, 
Montana, Nebraska, Arizona, and Texas. ER 000007 (Verified Complaint 7 8); ER 000025 
(Answer 7 9). Indeed, Mori testified during the preliminary injunction hearing in this matter that 
Leg-it conducted business in 11 Western states. ER 000212-000213 (10/22/08 Tr. p. 26, L. 20 - 
p. 30, L. 20); see also ER 000216. At the same time, TJT conducted its tire and axle recycling 
business in Idaho, Washington, Oregon, and California. ER 000006 (Verified Complaint 7 7); 
ER 000024 (Answer 7 8). The facts are undisputed; indeed, they were admitted in Mori's 
Answer and in Mori's deposition testimony. ER 000024-000025 (Answer 77 8-9, and 11); 
ER 000050 (Mori Depo., p. 56, L. 15 - p. 57, L. 2); ER 000061 (Mori Depo., p. 99, L. 3 - p. 100, 
L. 21); ER 000065 (Mori Depo., p. 114, LL. 8-12). Accordingly, the covenant not to compete 
contained in the Non-Competition Agreement is valid and enforceable under California law. 
Because the Non-Competition Agreement is enforceable under California law, it 
was error for the district court to grant summary judgment to Mori; likewise, it was error for the 
district court to deny TJT's motion for partial summary judgment2 on the issue of liability for 
breach of the Non-Competition Agreement. 
4. Covenants not to compete are enforceable as a matter of California 
law for so long as the buyer continues to carry on a like business. 
California Business and Professions Code Section 16601 provides that the seller 
of a business "may agree with the buyer to refrain from carrying on a similar business . . . so 
long as the buyer. . . carries on a lilce business . . . ." (Emphasis added.) In other words, so 
long as the buyer of a business (TJT) continues to operate that business (Leg-it), the seller (Mori) 
may be prevented from competing with the buyer (TJT) for an otherwise indefinite amount of 
time. 
This has been the law in California for over a hundred years and the cases so 
holding are legion. See, e.g., Ragsdale v. Nagle, 106 Cal. 332, 39 P. 628 (1895) (enforcing 
covenant made by seller of an abstracting business not to carry on a similar business so long as 
the purchasers should carry on a like business); Gregory v. Spieker, 110 Cal. 150,42 P. 576 
(1895) (same; medical supply business). Indeed, over the past century, the California appellate 
courts have affirmed this general rule on at least seven different occasions. See id.; Shafer v. 
Sloan, 3 Cal. App. 335,85 P. 162 (1906) (same; secondhand furniture business); Stephens v. 
Bean, 65 Cal. App. 779,224 P. 1022 (1924) (same; partnership interest); Johnston v. Blanchard, 
TJT seeks, as it did before the district court, partial summary judgment on the issues of 
the enforceability of the Non-Competition Agreement as well as breach of that agreement. There 
is no dispute that Mori has competed with TJT contrary to the terms of the Non-Competition 
Agreement. However, TJT leaves the question of damages and remedies for resolution by the 
district court. 
16 Cal. App. 321, 116 P. 973 (191 1) (same; advertising business); Martinez v. Martinez, 41 
Cal. 2d 704,263 P.2d 617 (1953) (same; ship supply business); see also Brown v. Kling, 101 
Cal. 295, 35 P. 995 (1894) (stating that covenant not to compete made ancillary to the sale of a 
business under predecessor to Section 16601 can be enforced so long as the buyer carries on a 
similar bu~iness).~ 
Notably, in Johnston v. Blanchard, 16 Cal. App. 321, 116 P. 973 (191 1); the 
seller of an advertising distribution business agreed to a non-compete with a term of thirty years 
from the date of the sale of the business. Id. at 324. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal 
enforced the thirty-year covenant, stating that a violation of the restriction would necessarily 
result in depriving the buyer of the goodwill of the business purchased and hinder and obstruct 
the buyer's successful pursuit and management of such business. Importantly, the court of 
appeals held that the buyer was "entitled to have the [thirty-year covenant in the] contract 
enforced for his protection so long as he carries on a like business . . . ." Id. at 328. 
Similarly, in Akers v. Rappe, 30 Cal. App. 290, 158 P. 129 (1916), the seller of a 
jewelry store agreed to a covenant not to compete with a term of twenty years from the date of 
the sale of the business. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal noted that it was practically 
undisputed that the seller of the business had reopened a jewelry store and was competing with 
See also Akers v. Rappe, 30 Cal. App. 290,158 P. 129 (1916) (enforcing twenty year 
covenant not to compete made ancillary to the sale of a jewelry store); Franz v. Bieler, 126 Cal. 
176, 180 (1899) (upholding ten year covenant not to compete); Mahlstedt v. Fugit, 79 Cal. App. 
2d 562,566 (1947) (upholding ten year covenant not to compete). 
Overruled on another point in Graca v. Rodrigues, 33 Cal. App. 296, 165 P. 1012 
(1917). 
the buyer. Id. at 292-93. As a result, the court of appeals reversed the judgment in favor of the 
defendant seller. In so doing, the court of appeals expressly rejected the seller's argument that 
the twenty-year non-compete provided for an unreasonable length of time, stating: 
We cannot agree with this contention. Section 1674 of the Civil 
Code [the predecessor to Section 166011 provides that "One who 
sells the goodwill of a business may agree with the buyer to refrain 
from carrying on a similar business within a specified county, city 
or a portion thereof as long as the buyer or any person deriving 
title to the goodwill from hi carries on a like business therein." 
The evidence shows that theplaintiff is still engaged in 
conducting the original business under a title thereto and to the 
goodwill thereof derived froin thepersons to whom the defendant 
sold the same, and with whom such contract was made, and that 
about six years intervened between the time of such original sale 
and the time of the opening of the second store. We think that 
these facts bring the case clearly within the provisions of the above 
section of the code, and also within the line of cases holding 
similar contracts to be valid. 
Id. at 293-94 (emphasis added; citations omitted). 
In view of the foregoing authorities, there can be no doubt that so long as TJT 
continues to operate the tire and axle recycling business it purchased from Mori, the duration of 
the parties' non-competition covenant is per se reasonable under the plain terms of 
Section 16601. Indeed, California law would clearly have allowed TJT to prohibit Mori from 
seeking competing employment within the tire and axle recycling industry for the remainder of 
his entire lifetime, so long as TJT continued to carry on a similar business during that period. 
Accordingly, the term of the Non-Competition Agreement must be enforced as written. 
5. Mori's subsequent employment with TJT does not invalidate or limit 
the duration of the covenant as a matter of law. 
The fact that the covenant does not go into effect until the day after Mori leaves 
his employment with TJT is irrelevant to the Court's determination as to the reasonableness of 
the duration of the covenant. The only salient factual inquiry is whether TJT is currently, and 
has at all times relevant to this dispute, continued to operate its tire and axle tire recycling 
business within the same geographic region as that previously occupied by Leg-it, the business 
that Mori sold to TJT. Because the fact of TJT's continued business operation within these 
parameters is undisputed in this case, the covenant continues to be enforceable as a matter of 
California law. 
Indeed, the California Court of Appeal has made it clear that covenants not to 
compete made ancillary to the sale of a business are enforceable under circumstances where the 
buyer purchases the seller's business, chooses to employ the seller for a period of time, and then 
the seller ultimately leaves his employment and attempts to compete with the buyer. See Vacco 
Indus. Znc. v. Tony Van Den Berg, 5 Cal. App. 4th 34, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 602 (1992); Hilb, Rogal & 
Hamilton Ins. Sews. v. Robb, 33 Cal. App. 4th 1812,39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 887 (1995). 
In Vacco, the California Court of Appeal enforced a covenant not to compete 
made ancillary to the sale o fa  business where the seller, like Mori, sold all of his shares of stock 
in the business to the buyer, and as part of the sale of the business, executed, like Mori, an 
employment agreement and a separate non-competition agreement. 5 Cal. App. 4th at 42-43. 
After the termination of his employment with the buyer, the seller/employee began to compete 
with his former employer. Id. at 43-44. Ultimately, the buyer commenced an action against the 
seller/employee for breach of the non-competition agreement. Id. at 44. A jury found that the 
seller/employee breached the non-competition agreement, but also found that the buyer breached 
the employment agreement by terminating the seller/employee without cause. Id. at 45. 
On appeal, the California Court of Appeal held the non-competition provision was 
enforceable. Id. at 47-48. The court of appeals rejected the seller/employee's argument that he 
was excused from breaching the non-competition agreement because the buyer breached the 
employment agreement by terminating him without cause. Id, at 49. In finding that the 
employment agreement and the non-competition agreement were two separate agreements with 
independent obligations, the court of appeals stated that: 
Indeed, the noncompetition agreement, as a practical matter, 
necessarily contemplated that [the seller/employee's] employment 
would at some point be terminated. . . . There is no justification 
for also excusing him fromperforming his promise not to 
compete with (the buyer] for a reasonableperiod following the 
sale of his stock which was given in exchange for the purchase of 
that stock, a matter quite aaart from his emplovment. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
Similarly, in Hilb, the seller of an insurance agency transferred all of his shares to 
the buyer in exchange for $245,000.00. 33 Cal. App. 4th at 1817-18. As part of the merger 
transaction, the seller executed a merger agreement and a separate employment contract. 
Included within the employment contract was a covenant not to compete, "which provided that 
for a three-yearperiod pfter the termination of employment, [seller] would not solicit or accept 
the business of his employer's [the buyer's] customers or prospective customers and would not 
engage in a competing business" in designated areas. Id. at 1017 (emphasis added). As 
consideration for the covenant, the seller received $52,500. Id. 
Approximately three years after the sale of the business in Hilb, the seller left his 
employment with the buyer and began to work for a competing insurance agency. Id. at 1018. 
The buyer sued the seller for breach of the covenant not to compete contained in the employment 
agreement. The district court refused to grant a preliminary injunction, finding that the buyer 
was not likely to prevail on "asserting the viability of the covenant." Id. at 1818-19. 
On appeal, the California Court of Appeal held that the covenant not to compete 
was indeed enforceable and viable. The court of appeals concluded that the seller sold all of his 
interest in the insurance agency purchased by the buyer and, thus, the transaction fit within 
Section 16601. Id. at 1824-25. The court of appeals also rejected the seller's argument that the 
covenant not to compete was invalid because it was contained in the employment agreement. Id. 
at 1825-26. In rejecting this argument, the court of appeals stated: 
Nothing in section 16601 requires that the covenant be contained 
in a particular type of document. Thepurpose of the statute is 
served as long as the covenant is executed in connection with the 
sale or disposition of all of the shareholder's stock in the 
acquired corporation. Section 16601 does not prescribe a format 
for a covenant not to compete, and we can find no reason to 
impose one. 
Id. (emphasis added). As further indicia that the covenant was made ancillary to the sale of a 
business, the court of appeals noted that the seller executed the covenant not to compete in his 
capacity as a seller shareholder, not solely as an employee. Id. at 1827. Notably, in Hilb, the 
California Court of Appeal did not take any issue with regard to the fact that the parties 
bargained for a covenant that did not go into effect until afier the seller terminated his 
employment with the buyer for a period of three years. 
The Hilb case applies nearly on all fours to the facts presented here. Mon sold all 
of his shares in Leg-it for the consideration in excess of $1 million. As part of the merger, Mon 
executed a Merger Agreement, a Non-Competition Agreement, and an Employment Agreement. 
Like the seller in Hilb, Mori expressly signed the Non-Competition Agreement in his capacity as 
"seller" of Leg-it. Also like the seller in HiZb, the Non-Competition Agreement prohibits Mori 
from competing in the tire and axle recycling business for two years after the termination of his 
employment with TJT. 
In light of holdings of the court in Vacco and Hilb, the parties' decision to 
structure the covenant to coincide with the termination of Mori's employment with TJT does not 
impair the validity or enforceability of the covenant as a matter of California law.* Accordingly, 
In addition to the clear authority that exists on this issue as a matter of California law, 
other states with statutes similar to California Business and Professions Sections 16000 and 
16001 also recognize that a seller of a business who remains employed by the buyer after the sale 
is subject to the enforcement of a covenant not to compete. See, e.g., Target Rental Towel, Inc. 
v. Byrd, 341 So. 2d 600,603 (La. Ct. App. 1977) (clause enforceable against seller of going 
concern who remained employee of purchaser after sale).' In Neeb-Kearney & Co., Znc. v. 
Rellstab, 593 So. 2d 741 (La. Ct. App. 1992), the Louisiana Court of Appeals succinctly stated: 
When a person (shareholder) sells a business and remains an 
employee after the sale, an agreement not to compete may be 
enforced against him. The concept is to protect those who are in a 
poor bargaining position, therefore the form of the agreement 
and the label tacked to the individual (employee, partner, 
shareholder) are immaterial. 
Id. at 748 (emphasis added; citation omitted). 
the district court erred in concluding that the Non-Competition Agreement was an "employment" 
covenant not to compete and therefore void pursuant to California Business and Professions 
Code Section 16600. 
6. The geographic boundaries of the Non-Competition Agreement are 
lawful and reasonable. 
Under California law, it was error for the district court to conclude that the Non- 
Competition Agreement was geographically overbroad. ER 000232-000233 (113 1/08 Order). 
For example, since before the turn of the 20th Century, California courts have enforced broad 
non-compete provisions. In Franz v. Bieler, 126 Cal. 176 (1899), the California Supreme Court 
enforced, pursuant to Section 16601's predecessor, a non-compete provision in which the 
defendant agreed he would not engage in the wine and liquor business "within the radius of ten 
miles in either direction from 809 East Fourteenth Street, in the city of Oakland, for the period of 
10 years." Id. at 180. The defendant argued that the provision was invalid, because the 
described area included three separate counties. The appellate court, however, found that the 
exact territory being described was ascertainable, and the agreement was enforceable to the 
extent the property fell withim the county where the defendant conducted business. The supreme 
court explained "that the inclusion of territory greater than that sanctioned by the code is void 
only as to the excess." Id. at 181 (emphasis added). 
In Mahlstedt v. Fugit, 79 Cal. App. 2d 562 (1947), as in Stephens, the California 
Court of Appeal enforced an agreement under Section 16601 that contained no geographical 
limitation at all. In Mahlstedt, the seller ofa  heater business agreed not to enter into that 
business as a manufacturer, owner, or salesman for ten years. The seller later argued that the 
agreement was void, because it did not contain a geographical limit, as required by 
' Section 16601. Id. at 566. The court of appeal, however, found that a contract with no 
geographical limit will be enforced to the extent permitted by law. Because the heating business 
was located in Los Angeles County, the court prohibited the seller from competing with the 
entire county 
In Mahlstedt, the California Court of Appeal succinctly stated the rules regarding 
enforcement of noncompetition provisions made ancillary to the sale of a business: 
On the date of the contract sections 1673 and 1674 of the Civil 
Code were in effect. (These provisions with slight modifications 
are now sections 16600 and 16601 of the Business and Professions 
Code.) As authorized by said sections of the Civil Code appellant, 
having transferred the good will of his business, agreed to refrain 
kom carrying on a similar business for a period of ten years. He 
contends that that portion of his agreement was void because it did 
not, as required by section 1674, specify the territory within which 
he agreed not to carry on his business. I f  such a contract is 
indefinite as to time or territow the court will construe it in such 
manner as to make it valid. I f  the contract is unrestricted as to 
the territory in which the seller apreed to refrain from 
competition with the nurchaser o f  his business, or i f  it includes 
more t e rr i to~  than that provided by law it will be construed to be 
operative within the counh, or portion thereof in which the 
business is located (City Carpet etc. Works v. Jones, 102 Cal. 
506,512 [36 P. 8411; Stephens v. Bean, 65 Cal. App. 779, 783 
[224 P. 10221; General Paint Corp. v. Seymour, 124 Cal. App. 
61 1, 614 [12 P.2d 990]), and if the agreement is indeterminate as 
to the period of its operation, or is without time limit, the court will 
construe it to cover the time permitted by law. (Gregory v. 
Spieker, 110 Cal. 150, 153 [42 P. 576,52 Am.St.Rep. 701; Brown 
v. Kiing, 101 Cal. 295,298 [35 P. 9951.) 
79 Cal. App. 2d at 566-67 (emphasis added); Kolani v. Gluska, 64 Cal. App. 4th 402,407-08 
(1998) (slating in dictum that several courts have "saved" covenants not to compete which were 
valid under 5 16601, but simply overbroad in scope). 
Although Mori relied on the case of Strategix, Ltd. v. Infocrossing West, Inc., 142 
Cal. App. 4th 1068 (2006), in arguing that the geographic scope of the Non-Competition 
Agreement is too broad, it is important to note that, in Strategix, the California Court of Appeal 
in no way overruled the vast body of California law summarized above in Mahlstedt. Indeed, the 
Strategix court cited Mahlstedt in recognizing that "Courts have 'blue penciled' noncompetition 
covenants with overbroad or omitted geographic and time restrictions to include reasonable 
limitations." 142 Cal. App. 4th at 1074. Accordingly, the result in Strategix appears to be 
limited to the specific facts presented in that case. 
Consistent with the polic)! expression demonstrated above, the California courts 
have routinely interpreted non-compete covenants and validated the same even though the 
covenants employed language overbroad in scope. Indeed, once the clause's general validity is 
established, no reason exists not to give weight to the parties' intentions, as expressed in the 
contract. See, e.g., Stephens v. Bean, 65 Cal. App. 779,783 (1924) (''No sound reason 
appears . . . why the intention of the parties may not be ascertained, as in other agreements, from 
a consideration of the terms of the contract as a whole."); CAL. CIVIL CODE § 1648 ("However 
broad may be the terns of a contract, it extends only to those things concerning which it appears 
that the parties intended to contract."). 
Most recently, the Califomia Court of Appeal found that an insurance broker 
carried on phases of its business in both the locations from which it sold insurance and the 
locations from which it procured insurance products to sell. See Alliant Ins. Svcs., Inc. v. Gaddy, 
159 Cal. App. 4th 1292 (2008). In Gaddy, the purchaser of an insurance brokerage 
acknowledged that the purchased business sold insurance "mostly in Northern California," but 
also argued that the purchased business conducted phases of its business outside of Northern 
Califomia because another part of that business involved relationships with insurance companies 
that provided insurance products for the broker to sell. Id. at 1303. In other words, the insurance 
brokerage had two phases to its business: a supply side and a demand side. The California Court 
of Appeal agreed that the locations from which the purchased business obtained insurance 
products to broker or sell to customers constituted a location in which some phase of its business 
was conducted, noting there were two components to the business: "(1) selling insurance to . . . 
clients, and (2) procuring insurance from insurance companies." Id. at 1305. Accordingly, the 
California Court of Appeal enforced the non-compete in all locations from which the purchased 
business procured insurance from insurance companies. 
By analogy to Gaddy, although Mori argues that the Leg-it production facility 
was located in Northern Califomia, he unquestionably admitted during sworn testimony at the 
preliminary i~ljunction hearing that Leg-it procured tires and axles from locations throughout 1 1 
Western states. ER 000212-000213 (10122108 Tr. p. 26, L. 20 - p. 30, L. 20); see also 
ER 000216. Thus, by support of the clear weight of California law, even if Leg-it's production 
facilities were "almost exclusively limited" to Northern California, that does not mean that the 
Non-Competition Agreement is unenforceable in locations outside of Northern California. At a 
minimum, the Non-Competition Agreement is operative in the areas in which Leg-it conducted 
some phase of its business, i.e., procured tires and axles to sell from its plant in Northern 
California. As a result, it was clear error for the district court to conclude--at the summary 
judgment stage-that the business of Leg-it was "almost exclusively limited" to Northern 
California. And, in light of Gaddy, it is clear that the district court erred, as the Non- 
Competition Agreement can be lawfully enforced in every location in which Leg-it formerly 
conducted some phases of its business, including the locations from which it procured tires and 
axles. 
7. The public policy justifications for limiting the duration of a covenant 
not to compete in an employment context do not apply where the 
covenant is made ancillary to the sale of a business. 
In enacting Section 16601, the California legislature articulated a conscious and 
well-reasoned distinction between the law of covenants not to compete as it applies to employers 
and employees, and the law as it applies to the buyers and sellers of a business. Although 
California law prohibits outright the use of non-competition agreements as a condition to 
employment, it expressly allows such agreements ancillary to the sale of a business to the 
reasonable extent necessary to allow the purchaser to obtain the benefit of his bargain, including 
the entire period of time in which the buyer continues to operate the same or similar business 
The reason for this distinction is because the public policy reasons that justifL the 
restriction of the use of such covenants in the employment context-unequal bargaining power 
between employer/employee; unfair restrictions on trade; etc.--do not generally apply in the 
context of the sale of a business. As one commentator has succinctly explained: 
A transfer of good will cannot be effectively accomplished without 
an enforceable agreement by the transferor not to act so as 
unreasonablv to diminish the value of that which he is selling. The 
- 
same is true in regard to any other property interest of which 
exclusive use is part of the value. The restraint on the transferor in 
such a case necessarily runs concurrently with the use of the 
property by the covenantee. . . . 
Unlike a restraint accompanying a sale of good will, an employee 
restraint is not necessary for the employer to get the full value of 
the thing being acquired-in this case, the employee's current 
services. . . . A sale of good will implies some obligation to 
deliver the thing sold by refraining from competition, just as an 
employment contract implies some obligation not to impair the 
value of the services rendered by competitive activity during the 
period of employment. But no such commitment not to compete 
after employment can be implied from an ordinary employment 
contract. . . . 
. . . theparties to an employee covenant are often of unequal 
bargainingpower and, thus, that there is less likelihood that the 
covenant was actually bargained for. They mayfind that the 
employee has improvidently given up his only valuable economic 
asset, specializedproficiency arising from experience or training. 
On the other hand, a seller ofproperty is more likely to have 
other sources of income or, in any event, income from the capital 
arising from the sale. Finally, they find that an employee 
covenant has an inevitable tendency to reduce an employee's 
mobility and bargainingpower during his employment. Because 
of these differences, courts are more likely to declare an employee 
covenant invalid as unreasonable, or, in giving injunctive relief, 
they are more likely to require that an employer settle for less 
thoroughgoing protection than that accorded a transferee of a 
property interest. 
Blake, Employee Agreements Not To Compete, 73 HARV. L. REV. 625,646-48 (1960) (emphasis 
added). 
Another commentator has observed that covenants not to compete made ancillary 
to the sale of a business are commonplace, as buyers of a business "would not invest in the 
enterprise unless the seller was restricted from competing with him." Gary P. Kohn, Comment, 
A Fresh. Look: Lowering the Mortality Rate of Covenants Not to Compete Ancillaiy to 
Employment Contracts and to Sale ofBusiness Contracts in Georgia, 31 EMORY L.J. 635,639 
(1982). When a seller is paid compensation for the covenant not to compete ancillary to the sale 
of his business, such 
capital that the seller receives from the transaction enables him to 
earn a livelihood in an alternate enterprise or at a different location, 
[and therefore] he is relatively unaffected by the covenant's 
restraints and does not have any substantial interest in need of 
protection. . . . 
. . . the bargaining powers of the seller of a business and the 
purchaser are likely to be more equal. The seller invariably is 
represented by an attorney during the sale of business transaction. 
Unlike an employment covenant, a sale of business covenant is 
more likely to be drufted only after extensive negotiations by the 
attorneys for bothparties. Moreover, the seller is typically in a 
stronger bargaining position than the employee because the seller's 
business is usually of greater relative value to the buyer than are 
the services of one employee to the employer. As a result of the 
comparative differences in the bargaining positions, the seller 
receives additional compensation for entering into a covenant not 
to compete that he may utilize after his business is sold. In 
contrast, by signing a post-termination covenant, the employee 
divests himself of his primary means of earning a living-his 
specialized skills developed from his prior knowledge and 
experience-and receives nothing in return. Therefore, the 
surrender of one's right to complete is much more burdensome to 
the employee than it is to the seller of a business. 
Id. at 640-42 (emphasis added).6 
Simply put, the kind of equitable concerns that exist in the context of an 
employer-employee covenant are not relevant to the Court's consideration of the covenant at 
issue here. Mori, as a businessman, negotiated the TJTiLeg-it merger and the parties conducted 
due diligence for approximately one year with representation by counsel. ER 000043-000044 
(Mori Depo., p. 29, LL. 7-14 and p. 29, L. 19 - p. 30, L. 13); ER 0000222-000228. The Non- 
Competition Agreement that resulted from that extensive, year-long negotiation and due 
diligence was generated through open and knowledgeable bargaining. There is nothing in the 
record to indicate a disparity in bargaining power between the parties during the course of those 
negotiations. TJT's insistence on the execution of a covenant not to compete was critical to its 
decision to consummate the TJT/Leg-it merger. Had Mori rehsed to execute such a covenant, 
Courts have also l~aditionally recognized the public policy distinctions between the two 
different categories of non-compete agreements. See Golden State Linen Sews., Inc. v. Vidalin, 
69 Cal. App. 3d 1, 12, 137 Cal. Rph. 807 (1977) (recognizing the validity of the "status" 
distinction as drawn between an ex-employee and the seller of a business in enforcing a covenant 
not to compete) (citing the RESTATEMENT OF C O N ~ C T S  5 5 15, cl. (a), com. b and illus. 1 and 
Comment, Employee Agreements Not To Compete, 73 HARV. L. REV. 625,648 nn.75 and 76 
(1960)); Monogram Indus., Inc. v. SAR Indus., Inc., 64 Cal. App. 3d at 697 ("[~Jovenants arising 
out of the sale of a business are more liberally enforced than those arising out of the employer- 
employee relationship."). See also Baker v. Starkey, 259 Iowa 480,491, 144 N.W.2d 889,895 
(1 966) (stating that non-competition clauses in employment contracts are scrutinized differently 
than similar clauses in contracts for the sale of a business because goodwill is more important in 
the latter and because there is less risk of a disparity of bargaining power in contracts ibr the sale 
of a business); Jacobsen & Co. v. Int'l Env't Corp., 427 Pa. 439,452,235 A.2d 612,619 (1967) 
(stating that "'a more stringent test of reasonableness' is imposed [on employment non- 
competition clauses] than would be applied to such restrictive covenants ancillary to the sale of 
the business") (citation omitted). 
the deal would not have gone through, because TJT knew it would have been purchasing a 
business without the ability to reap the benefits of the goodwill it was paying for. 
Moreover, Mori was gainfully employed at the time of the 1997 merger and could 
easily have chosen to remain so employed by declining TJT's offer of purchase. Mori was not 
required to "succumb" to the condition of the covenant in order to get/keep his job, in the way an 
ordinary employee might have been. Indeed, it was Mori who approached TJT to initiate 
discussions regarding the purchase of Leg-it. ER 000043-000044 (Mori Depo., p. 29, LL. 7-14, 
p. 29, L. 19 - p. 30, L. 13). To the extent that Mori may not be abfe to put his work experience 
to use during the period of enforcement of the covenant without moving outside of his former 
business territory, this fact was both entirely foreseeable and objectively quantified at the time of 
the Leg-it merger in 1997, when Mori negotiated the price that he required TJT to pay him for 
the likelihood of that eventuality. 
In addition, the absence of any inequitable injury stemming from the enforcement 
of the covenant is further underscored by the fact that Mori negotiated for the equivalent offive 
years' salary in exchange for his promise not to compete for two years. ER 000043 (Mori Depo., 
p. 29, LL. 15-18). Thus, should Mori choose not to pursue a career outside of the tire and axle 
recycling industry and/or outside of the region where TJT conducts its business during the two- 
year term of the Non-Competition Agreement, Mori still cannot legitimately claim an economic 
injury here. 
Therefore, there is nothing either unique or compelling about this argument under 
the facts of this case requiring the district court to invalidate the Non-Competition Agreement.7 
The Non-Competition Agreement must be enforced as a valid covenant not to compete made 
ancillary to the sale of a business pursuant to California Business and Professions Code 
Section 16601. 
B. The District Court Erred in Awarding Attorney's Fees to Mori. 
1. Standard of review. 
An award of attorney fees is "within the discretion of the trial court and subject to 
review for an abuse of discretion." Ransom v. Topaz Mktg., L.P., 143 Idaho 641,643, I52 P.3d 
2 ,4  (2006). Whether a statute awarding attorney fees applies is a question of law over which 
this Court exercises free review. Id. at 644, 152 P.3d at 5. 
Indeed, in prior sworn deposition testimony in 2001, defendant Mori recognized the 
enforceability of his Non-Competition Agreement with TJT, stating: 
Q. During the time that you were employed at TJT, have you 
ever had discussions with anybody about starting a new business 
that would compete with TJT? 
A. Compete how, with what? 
Q. In the tire and axle business, in the general area that TJT 
does business. 
A. 1 can 't do that. 
Q. Did you ever have any discussions about doing that? 
A. I can't do that. 
ER 000161 (2001 Deposition of Ulysses Mori, p. 119, LL. 1-12) (emphasis added). 
2. The parties chose California law to govern the Non-Competition 
Agreement. 
Mori's reliance on Idaho law to support his claim for attorney's fees is 
fundamentally misplaced. Specifically, Mori claimed in the district court entitlement to 
attomey's fees by relying on Idaho Code Section 12-120(3). In his briefing before the district 
court, Mori acknowledged the validity of this contractual choice of law provision and previously 
cited Idaho authorities to support the proposition that parties can agree to choose the law that will 
apply to their agreement in both commercial and non-commercial settings. ER 0000195. 
Because the parties selected a valid and enforceable California choice of law provision in the 
Non-Competition Agreement, there can be no question that California law-not Idaho law- 
applies to all aspects of any dispute regarding the Non-Competition Agreement, including Mori's 
claim of entitlement to attomey's fees under that agreement. 
3. Under California law, Mori is not entitled to claim an award of 
attorney's fees pursuant to a provision in the Non-Competition 
Agreement. 
Although the district court found the Non-Competition Agreement to be &, 
Mori hoped to resuscitate the voided contract one last time in the district court to claim the 
benefit of a provision allowing for recovery of attorney's fees. ER 000238-000239 (Mori's 
Memorandum for Attorney Fees and Costs at 3-4). In other words, Mori wanted it both ways. 
He first argued to the district court that the Non-Competition Agreement is void and illegal, but 
then argued that certain provisions that inure to his benefit survive the district court's ruling 
voiding the contract. California law does not permit Mori to take such inconsistent positions and 
eliminates Mori's claim to fees under the Non-Competition Agreement. See Geflen v. Moss, 53 
Cal. App. 3d 2 15 (1 975). The black letter rule in California is that when a court declares a 
contract void, the contract is void ab initio and neither party to that contract can point to an 
attorneys' fee provision in the voided contract to claim entitlement to an award of fees. Id. 
Here, this Court has declared the Non-Competition Agreement to be &d and, under G@en and 
the California cases following its holding, the attorney fee provision is also void. 
In the district court's analysis of the enforceability oEthe Non-Competition 
Agreement, it began by recognizing that California Business and Professions Code 
Section 16600 declares covenants not to compete to be void. ER 0000231 (1/31/08 Order at 3). 
The district court relied on Mori's repeated arguments that the Non-Competition Agreement was 
void and the district court ultimately found "as a matter of law that the scope of the non- 
competition agreement. . . is void as a matter oflaw." ER 000232 (emphasis added); ER 
000234 ("'Because the Court ruled as a matter of law that the non-compete agreement is &d, 
TJT's motion for partial summary judgment is moot.") (emphasis added). 
Under California law and a common legal understanding, the word "void" means 
illegal. See Geffen, 53 Cal. App. 3d at 227; Yuba Cypress Hous. v. Area Developers, 98 Cal. 
App. 4th 1077, 108 1-82 (2002); Edwards v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 44 Cal. 4th 937,946, 189 
P.3d 285, 289 (Cal. 2008) ("restraints on trade are 'illegal."'); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1573 
(6th ed. 1990). When a contract is declared void or illegal, the California courts will not allow 
any party to enforce any of its provisions, including a provision allowing for the recovery of 
attorney's fees. See Geffen, 53 Cal. App. 3d at 227; Yuba Cypress Hous., 98 Cal. App. 4th at 
1081-82. Specifically, in Geffen, an attorney sold his law practice to another attorney, which 
included physical assets, a lease for office space, existing client files, and the expectation of 
future business from the existing clients of the selling attorney. Id. at 219-20. The district court 
concluded that the terms of contract for sale included the goodwill of the law practice and that 
such sale was void against public policy under California law. Id. at 221. Although the district 
court declared the contract against public policy, the district court allowed the buying attorney to 
recover attorney's fees pursuant to the contract for sale. Id. 
On appeal, the California Court of Appeal affirmed the district court's conclusion 
that the contract for sale of the law practice was illegal. Id. at 222-26. The appellate court then 
addressed the selling attorney's argument that, because the contract was illegal, no party could 
enforce its terms, including an attorneys' fee provision in the contract. Id. In reversing the 
district court's award of attorney's fees, the California Court of Appeal stated: 
Geffen [the sellinp attornevl arpues that, i f  the contract is held to 
be ille~al, the award o f  attornev's fees in favor o f  Moss [the 
buvinp attorney1 as the prevailina par@ would be imurouer. .F& 
must a w e .  In paragraph If3 the agreement provides for the 
payment of the $12,500 in installments and, in the event of default 
and the tiling of suit to enforce payment, for attorney's fees to 
Geffen [the selling attorney]. Civil Code section 1717 renders the 
obligation to pay attorney's fees mutual. However, since we have 
decided that the oblipation to pav the $12.500 is contrarv to 
public policv and unenforceable the right to attorney's fees 
created bv this provision never matured. 
Id. at 227. Accordingly, the Court of appeals modified the judgment by striking the award of 
attorney's fees. Id 
The Geffen rule continues to exist today and has never been overruled. In 1988, 
the California Court of Appeal reaffirmed the Geffen rule, stating: 
Ordinarily, in an action on a contract which provides for an award 
of attorney's fees, the prevailing party in the action is entitled to 
attorney's fees. (Civ. Code, 9 1717, subd. (a).) This is so even 
when the party prevails on grounds the contract is inapplicable, 
invalid, unenforceable or nonexistent, if the other party would have 
been entitled to attorney's fees had it prevailed. 
However, a different rule applies where a contract is held 
unenforceable because o f  illepalitv. Geffen v. Moss (1975) 53 
Cal. App. 3d 215 is directlv on point. In that case, the court held 
a par@ mav not recover attornev's fees when it successfullv 
defends an action on a contract on the ground the contract 
violated public polict. In Geflen, the contract was declared void as 
violative of public policy. The court refused to award attorney's 
fees, explaining, "Civil Code section 1717 renders the obligation to 
pay attorney's fees mutual. However, since we have decided that 
the obligation to [perform under the contract] is contrary to public 
policy and unenforceable the right to attorney's fees created by this 
provision never matured." 
A partv to a contract who successfullv araues its illegalitv stands 
on different ground than a par& who prevails in an action on a 
contract bv convincina tke court the contract is inap~licable, 
invalid, nonexistent or unenforceable for reasons other than 
illegality. "The effect of the Geffen decision is that where neither 
party can enforce the agreement there is no need for a mutual right 
to attorney's fees." 
Consistent with our decision that the contract is illegal and void, 
we a f fm the trial court's order denying [the prevailing party's] 
claim for attorney's fees. 
Bovard v. Am. Horse Enters., Inc., 201 Cal. App. 3d 832,842-43 (1988) (citations omitted; 
emphasis added). 
Accordingly, there can be no doubt that Geffen and its progeny defeat Mori's 
claim for attorney's fees pursuant to the Non-Competition Agreement. Specifically, the Geffen 
case is on all fours with the facts presented here. Like Geflen, the instant case involves the 
purchase and sale of a business, including the goodwill of the business. The district court 
declared the Non-Competition Agreement made ancillary to the purchase and sale of Leg-it to be 
void as a matter of law and therefore illegal under California law. Because the district c o k  
declared the Non-Competition Agreement to be void, Mori's claimed right to attorney's fees 
created by the Non-Competition Agreement never matured and is likewise void. 
4. The district court erred in failing to consider all factors under Idaho 
Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(3) in connection with the award of 
attorney's fees to Mori. 
Under clearly existing Idaho law, a district court is required to analyze all 
applicable factors under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(3) prior to issuing an award of 
attorney's fees. Parsons v. Mut. ofEnumclaw Inc., Co., 143 Idaho 743, 747, 152 P.3d 614,618 
(2007). The district court need not specifically address each of the factors, so long as the record 
indicates that it considered them all. Id. 
Taken as a whole, the record clearly indicates that the district court did not 
analyze or even consider the appropriate Rule 54(e)(3) factors prior to awarding Mori attorney's 
fees in excess of $100,000 and prior to ruling on TJT's motion for reconsideration. First, the 
district court first granted Mori's request for attorney's fees without the benefit of a hearing, 
stating in a two page Order the following, but nowhere in the district court's did it indicate that it 
considered the Rule 54(e)(3) factors in connection with awarding attorney's fees to Mori. 
ER 000268 (612108 Order). 
And, upon TJT's request for reconsideration, the district court simply analyzed 
the "time and labor required" under Rule 54(e)(3)(A) to the exclusion of all other Rule 54(e)(3) 
factors. ER 000272 (1 1/21/08 Order). Apart from the lone reference to the "time and labor" 
factor under Rule 54(e)(3)(A), there is no indication in the record that the district court 
considered all Rule 54(e)(3) factors in connection with its award of attorney's fees to Mori. 
Accordingly, in the event this Court affirms the district court's holding that the Nan-Competition 
Agreement is void, and further a f f m s  the district court's award of attorney's fees, Mori requests 
this Court to remand the determination of the amount of the fee award to the district court so that 
all applicable Rule 54(e)(3) factors may be properly considered. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, TJT respecthlly requests this Court to reverse the 
district court's grant of summary judgment to Mori, to grant partial summary judgment in favor 
of TJT, and to reverse the district court's award of attorney's fees to Mori. 
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